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Abstract
This paper is organized into four chapters that focus on the terrorist group Al Qaeda in the Lands of
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The four chapters examine different facets of the collective
environment that have allowed AQIM to succeed and even thrive at times. The first chapter begins
with Algeria’s war of independence with the French. The second chapter focuses on the nomadic
Tuareg people. It seeks to show how the Tuaregs were deprived by French occupiers and how
European colonization cost the Tuaregs access to vital trade routes used for centuries. The third
chapter will very briefly examine Algeria’s civil war and the emergence of modern terrorist groups.
The fourth chapter will discuss the post-9/11 world in terms of “shaping operations” for the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT ) and how this caused an evolution in terrorism as a reaction to actual or
perceived American hegemonic ambitions.This paper is not a compendium of every event or in any
way a complete history of the region. It is intended to reinforce the author’s notion of outlying
antecedents that normally coalesce around a central issue and how the addition of a political agenda
can lead these antecedents toward a fusion point. When the fusion point is met, ethno-nationalist
ambitions are catapulted down the road of terrorism and the fundamental message is lost in the debris
of another attack. Such is the story of AQIM…
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol2/iss2/253
Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic 
Maghreb
Gregory A. Smith
Preface
the devastating terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 will forever  
resonate in the minds of americans. the images of billowing smoke  
emanating from the World trade center and the Pentagon caused many 
to ask “who could do this to us?” to answer that question we must  
examine the past and look at the policies enacted by our government that 
caused a cyclic reaction within our enemy. the same is true for other 
governments that seek to expand their sphere of influence without  
examining those critical antecedents that affect the indigenous 
  population. these disenfranchised subjects, when facing a foreign  
invader or apostate government, will often draw on a shared identity, be 
it cultural, ethnic, religious, or political, to sound the battle cry of  
resistance.
this paper is organized into four chapters that focus on the terrorist 
group Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (aQiM). the four 
chapters examine different facets of the collective environment that have 
allowed aQiM to succeed and even thrive at times. the first chapter 
begins with algeria’s war of independence with the french. it focuses on 
how the algerians were able to successfully isolate the french from the 
population through the use of terrorism. it also lays the foundation for 
the concept of terrorism within algeria to further a political agenda.
the second chapter focuses on the nomadic tuareg people. it seeks to 
show how the tuaregs were deprived by french occupiers and how  
european colonization cost the tuaregs access to vital trade routes used 
for centuries. the intent of this chapter is to briefly explain reasons for 
the lack of trust between the tuaregs and foreign forces. it also seeks to 
show the exceptional ability to navigate the Sahara and how smuggling 
has become the basis of income for many tuaregs.
the third chapter will very briefly examine algeria’s civil war and the 
emergence of modern terrorist groups. it seeks to show the politicization 
of islam by the government and the struggle to return the fundamental 
aspects. the emergence of the groupe islamic armie (gia) and the  
ensuing rise of the Salafist group for Preaching and combat (gSPc) 
played a significant role in shaping the modern landscape across the 
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region. it will conclude with the arrival of american forces into the region 
and the resulting reaction.
the fourth chapter will discuss the post-9/11 world in terms of  
“shaping operations” for the global War on terrorism (gWot) and how 
this caused an evolution in terrorism as a reaction to actual or perceived 
american hegemonic ambitions. the arrival of aQiM served as a  
fusion point for many smaller terrorist groups and exacerbated an 
already difficult situation. it will examine the many facets of aQiM’s 
recruiting strategy of blending ethno-nationalism with religious identity 
to accomplish its near and far goals. it will also discuss the collaboration 
between the tuaregs and aQiM on transit issues and mutual assistance 
against government threats.
this paper is not a compendium of every event or in any way a complete 
history of the region. it is intended to reinforce the author’s notion of 
outlying antecedents that normally coalesce around a central issue and 
how the addition of a political agenda can lead these antecedents toward 
a fusion point. When the fusion point is met, ethno-nationalist ambitions 
are catapulted down the road of terrorism and the fundamental message 
is lost in the debris of another attack. Such is the story of aQiM…
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Section One: The War for  
Independence: A State is Born
Introduction
to understand the mindset of terrorist groups in the Maghreb, you must 
understand the history of struggle in the region. this chapter will briefly 
examine algeria’s War of independence with france from 1954–1962 and 
its immediate aftermath. Many important characters are not mentioned 
in this chapter as they do not relate to the overall point of this paper 
which is the nationalist ambitions of a people, coupled with religious 
identity, and portrayed in the continual struggle for control. the first 
instance of this modern struggle occurred in algeria following World War 
ii. the War of independence was a pivotal time in north african history 
as colonial doctrine and islamic ambitions met head on in what would 
become a continual struggle in the battle of ideologies.
The War for Independence: 1954–1962
imperialism was the order of the day until World War ii. Since as long as 
history has been recorded, a stronger country or band of people have  
attempted to conquer and control the weaker. africa was no different. With 
Portugal and Spain conquering the majority of the out rim of the african 
continent, france, germany, and Belgium worked their way through the 
center. following the anglo-french agreement of 1889, france was  
granted significant influence over an area from the african coast to niger 
river.1 Much of this area would be known as french West africa. this 
agreement gave france considerable influence over the Sahel and the 
Sahara.
World War ii changed the composition of the boundaries in africa as 
germany saw her influence greatly diminished. the colonial powers were 
slowly coming to an end as europe lay in ruins and vital resources were 
diverted to the rebuilding effort at home. at the same time, a man named 
Menachim Begin and his group irgun launched an offensive in   British 
Palestine. this was a new type of war as it did not involve the world 
  powers vying for control but was a smaller insurgent group challenging a 
larger power for control. the insurgency levied a tremendous cost to the 
British and resulted in the united Kingdom, already weary from years of 
war, withdrawing from Palestine. the nationalistic efforts of irgun led 
to the formal creation of the State of israel. israel’s insurgency served as 
a model to many nations and it wasn’t long until similar events sprung 
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up in cyprus, armenia, Vietnam, and algeria. the smaller nations used 
the advantage of local support to isolate the occupying forces from the 
  population.2 By isolating the larger force, you diminish their influence 
over the mass and delegitimize their justification for maintaining a  
presence.
recognizing the anti-colonial movement of the people, several smaller 
political parties merged to become the national liberation front (fln) 
in 1954. these groups waged a political and military struggle for  
independence that began in november of that year.3 the fln engaged in 
a series of bombings against french security forces in algiers. the fln 
had hoped to force french troops to remain in garrison as a safety  
measure. By remaining in garrison, the fln would secure local support 
and increase participation in the revolution.
leading the flns push for independence was larbi Ben M’Hidi, an  
algerian nationalist and devout Muslim. M’Hidi felt that algerians were 
becoming westernized through the continual colonization of  
algerian lands by french settlers. He and ramdane abane set about in 
  establishing a guerilla campaign that focused less on direct   confrontation 
and more on the psychological aspects of the conflict. abane felt if the 
fln could capture the imaginations of independence by the algerian 
population that any hope of french success in the region would be lost.4 
the fundamental aspect of an internal revolution, supported by the local 
population, in order to return to a traditional islamic state is what drives 
insurgent groups such as al Qaeda to this day. M’Hidi and abane are 
regarded as the fathers of the revolution and serve as an inspiration to 
modern algerian insurgents.
to accomplish the task of winning the psychological war, the fln 
  established an underground movement known as the Zone autonome 
d’alger (Zaa).5 the Zaa would prepare to engage in urban terrorism and 
become famous in the movie The Battle of Algiers. in September 1956, 
the Zaa delivered the opening salvo by bombing several tourist locations 
popular with europeans. the urban warfare insurgency had two main 
goals. first, it would prey on the “intruders” from europe and dissuade 
further tourism. By reducing the number of european visitors and  
systematically eliminating french control in algiers, the fln would  
increase its foothold and continue to gain support. Second, the urban 
campaign would divert french resources to the defense of algiers and al-
low the fln time to build its rural uprising throughout algeria. the  
future of the revolution depended on these simultaneous strategies  
coinciding with one another.
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Section one: the War for independence: a State is Born
ramdane abane6 anticipated a french reaction and knew that it would 
draw the local population behind the fln. His campaign of incessant 
small bombings ensured the french would respond, and respond they 
did. general Jacques Massu arrived in algiers to establish order. Massu 
launched a counterterrorism campaign that involved rounding up  
suspected insurgents and committing acts of torture to secure their  
confession. Massu succeeded in killing Ben M’Hisi, destroying the Zaa, 
and forcing the fln leadership into exile. His tactics were swift and  
lethal which allowed him to quickly and ruthlessly suppress the fln. 
While Massu’s method of rigid control of the Muslim population did 
eventually establish order, it cost the french the much needed support 
of the local population. the majority of algerians did not lend support to 
the fln but did respond by uniting under the banner of nationalism.7
the Battle of algiers, while an effective counterinsurgency campaign, 
cost the french the overall goal of retaining algeria as a colonial  
possession. they had soundly defeated the fln at the expense of the  
conflict as a whole. the ensuing three years resulted in france depicted 
as an occupying and oppressive force that lacked popular support. With 
Morocco and tunisia gaining independence in 1957, algeria would soon 
follow suit in 1962.8 france relinquished her colonial claim to algeria and 
an independent country was born.
as official independence approached, the fln leadership met in to  
discuss the transition from revolutionary organization to political party. 
the tripoli Program called for massive reforms and the large-scale 
nationalization of algeria’s industrial infrastructure.9 as a   revolutionary 
group, the fln was effective in developing a guerilla campaign that 
turned the struggle in their eventual favor. as a political organization, the 
fln would soon realize the difficulty of establishing control in the  
political arena.
Post-Independence: 1962–1989
in the years following independence, the fln tightened its grip on 
control of algeria. the majority of fighting came from coups within the 
fln itself and resulted in Ben Bella assuming the presidency. Ben Bella 
was a member of the original executive committee of the fln during the 
War for independence and had the support of the national assembly. 
He spent a significant amount of time nationalizing the major industry 
sectors vacated by french owners who had fled. this nationalization 
produced an economic boom in algeria as well as objections from smaller 
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political groups.10 these groups joined forces in an attempt to overthrow 
the Ben Bella government in 1963. fighting erupted in the Kabylie region 
in the north and along the Sahel to the south.11 the algerian army, led by 
Minister of Defence Houari Boumedienne, put down both insurrections 
and consolidated his position as leader of the armed forces. Ben Bella  
reversed his course and attempted to include the insurgents in his 
government. this created a significant amount of tension and distrust 
between Ben Bella and the fln leaders in power.
tensions reached a crescendo in 1965 when Boumedienne successfully 
completed a coup and assumed presidency. He went on to declare a  
state of emergency, dissolve the national assembly, and declare  
himself the absolute ruler of algeria. Boumedienne successfully  
instituted a policy of non-alignment and maintained favorable relations 
with both the east and West. Boumedienne remained in power until he 
died from a blood disorder in 1978. an intense power struggle within the 
fln followed with the ascension of chadli Bendjedid. the new president 
did not share his predecessor’s ability to balance the economy and the 
population. algeria’s industrial base lingered and unemployment soared 
through the early 1980s. a disenchanted population would look for  
answers to daily problems and a revised and recharged version of islam 
was on the way.
Iran and Afghanistan
in 1979, a revolution occurred in iran. iranian students had rallied behind 
the religious leader ayatollah Khomeini and succeeded in deposing the Shah. 
this religious revival served as proof of what could be accomplished if  
faithful followers combined forces under the rallying cry of islam.12 this 
religious revival created a wave of religious ideology over the greater Middle 
east. the colonial pastimes and feelings of dependence on foreign  
powers gave way to a shared religious drive that inspired millions of  
Muslims across the globe.
also in 1979, Soviet tanks entered afghanistan under the guise of  
restoring stability to the region. the outrage shared by Muslims around 
the world manifested in thousands joining the ranks of the faithful. the 
religious sense of duty compelled many to travel to neighboring  
Pakistan to join the Jihad against the occupying forces. a Palestinian 
teacher named abdullah azzam led this charge by establishing the office 
of Services of the Holy Warriors.13 azzam’s organization would soon  
attract the likes of osama bin laden and, together, they would create the 
basis for the global jihadist network that would become al Qaeda.
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Section one: the War for independence: a State is Born
the spirit of the iranian revolution and the establishment of the  
Mujahedeen in afghanistan would have a lasting effect on the emerging 
militancy of islam in algeria. clerics began to preach against the  
westernized appearance of algerian women as well as the drinking of 
alcohol and lack of religious conviction of algerian men. this led to a 
significant rise of islamic activity and objection to the ruling government 
and would play a major role in the coming years.
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Introduction
to know a man, you must know his history. to identify with this man, you 
must understand his culture, his way of life, and his motives. too often, 
we impart our ignorance on a people and expect them to comply with our 
demands without argument or hesitation. Western cultures expect to see 
these instant results without looking at the tremendous turmoil it causes 
to the local population. this chapter will discuss the role of the tuaregs in 
this conflict. it seeks to briefly examine their history, the loss of traditional 
tuareg lands as a result of european colonization, and the role of the 
tuaregs in smuggling goods across the Sahara.
A Brief History
in the vast wilderness of the Sahara live a people without a state. these 
people, the tuaregs, have long occupied the empty expanses of the Sahel. 
Moving from oasis to oasis, they often survived on traded goods and lived 
in tents of woven camel hair.14 their culture thrived as the preeminent 
trans-Saharan traders of salt, gold, ivory, and slaves throughout the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. for nearly 1,000 years, the tuareg 
operated this caravan trade connecting the cultural centers and cities that 
bordered the southern edge of the Sahara via five desert trade routes to 
the Mediterranean Sea port cities on the northern coast of africa.15
the french colonial ambitions in africa soon brought them into contact 
with the tuareg. french expeditions through the Sahara made their way 
to the niger river and led to the creation of french West africa.16 With 
territorial boarders appearing along the trade routes, it wasn’t long before 
a confrontation between the french military and tuaregs occurred. the 
superior weapons of the french swiftly defeated those who resisted and 
forced the tuareg to forfeit historical lands. Most were incorporated  
under french dominance and the tribal groups were dismantled.17 the 
once proud people were now subjected to french colonial rule.
tuaregs follow the Maliki Madh’hab line of islam. this fiqh was  
established based on the preaching of imam Malik18 and is the third  
largest of the four recognized schools. islam is the central binding factor 
for the tuareg people and the offering of hospitality and shelter is an  
important theme when examining their relationship with radical  
elements within the Sahel. the tuareg also combine Sunni islam with 
pre-islamic animistic beliefs such as Kel asuf.19
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Borders
following the establishment of french West africa, artificial borders 
were established that prevented the tuareg people from traveling long 
established routes across the Sahara. this loss of vital commerce greatly 
affected native tuaregs and many were forced to the cities in search of 
employment and shelter.
the independence movement pervaded the world following World War ii. 
traditional colonies of european countries were quick to capitalize on the 
weakened state of their former masters and north africa was no exception. 
in the late 1950s, there was a tremendous push for independence from 
france and french West africa soon fractured into an ethnic free-for-all. 
in 1960, the breakup of french West africa resulted in the establishment 
of the countries of Mali, niger, Burkina faso, and libya. these new  
countries, along with algeria, were quick to establish territorial borders 
that transcended traditional tuareg lands. the tuaregs revolted in Mali 
and niger but were defeated in both cases and attempted to reunify with 
fellow tribes in the region. the revolt was crushed and the tuareg people 
were, in many cases, forced to abandon their traditional nomadic lifestyle 
in order to survive.
it is important to note the psyche of the tuaregs during this period in 
terms of the potential for conflict. environmental and economic scarcity in 
both cases lends themselves to the potential for violence and a general lack 
of trust. environmental scarcity comes in the form of the newly established 
borders. traditional routes across the Sahara were no longer accessible. 
the dynamic environment that had been a staple for these people was, in 
many cases, forever lost. the loss of revenue generated from these routes 
led to the economic scarcity that forces many tuaregs to the squalor of the 
ghettos that had become commonplace in africa. the lack of economic 
opportunity led many tuareg to commit crimes in order to advance their 
economic prospects.20 in both cases, forced migration due to these external 
circumstances would play a role in the tuareg mindset when dealing with 
outside agencies in years to come.
an extreme drought occurred in the Sahel from 1968–1974. the   tuareg 
population in Mali was particularly affected. Many tuaregs, along with 
their cherished livestock, perished during the ensuing famine. the 
  promised assistance from the government never materialized and the  
tuaregs, already distrustful of these new regional leaders, developed a 
bitter hatred for the Malian government. this intense dissatisfaction 
with the government of Mali and eventually niger continued to   fester 
as   tuareg conditions continued to worsen. the situation reached a 
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  crescendo in the spring of 1990 when tuaregs attacked a Malian police 
station near the border with niger.21 the ensuing government   crackdown 
resulted in hundreds of tuaregs killed. niger and Mali identified the 
tuaregs as a security threat while tuaregs felt the governments were 
persecuting them to the point of extinction.
Smuggling
With the loss of traditional trading routes, many tuaregs began to 
  smuggle goods as a means to survive. With their historical knowledge 
across the Sahara, many could find work smuggling cigarettes, drugs, and 
other illicit commodities. tuaregs distrust for the governments of the  
region grew as captured smugglers were imprisoned for illegal  
commerce.
the civil war in algeria (see chapter three) resulted in new   opportunities 
as tuareg smugglers were often the only means of goods in the   southern 
regions of algeria. the caravans of camels were slowly replaced 
  four-wheel drive toyota pickups and the smuggling business boomed 
throughout the later 1990s. it was around this time the tuaregs began 
a loose alliance with another group of people. radical islamic   fighters, 
fresh from the battlefields of afghanistan and eager to topple the   apostate 
leaders of the region, found they had an ally in the tuaregs. although 
on opposite ends of the ethno-nationalist spectrum, both   parties wanted 
the same thing: the removal of godless tyrants from power. the   tuaregs 
wanted the borders erased and a return to the traditional norms that 
were seized during french colonization and the creation of several 
  independent states. the islamic fighters wanted an islamic state in 
algeria and, ultimately, a pan-Sahelian caliphate. the tuareg   smugglers 
began to transport arms along the established routes to help fuel the 
  insurgency. a new era was brewing along the Sahara and across the 
Sahel.
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Section Three: Algeria’s civil war  
and 9/11
Introduction
“Mr gorbachev, tear Down this Wall!” exclaimed President ronald  
reagan. america rejoiced as the united States watched her archrival fall. 
the cold War was ending and freedom was sweeping the globe. the  
mujahedin in afghanistan had defeated the Soviet union and 
  demonstrated the power of Jihad. now it was time for these brave holy 
warriors to return to their homes. as with every war, fighting changes a 
man as his convictions become deeper and his views become even more 
entrenched in his mind. this was the case with islam. a conservative 
strand of islam was beginning to take shape as these fighters returned 
home, emboldened by training and inspired by Pakistan’s firebrand 
version of islam. no longer would they be subjugated to apostate 
  governments. By organizing, they could win and establish at home what 
they had helped in afghanistan. islam was on the offensive.
Riots and the GIA
following independence from france, algeria became a   predominantly 
one-party government. the fln had controlled all facets of the 
  government from the interior to the army. they had promoted a   socialist 
agenda and had relied heavily on oil revenues. along the way, many 
  algerians felt the fln had lost its way in terms of representing the 
people. the “people’s party” was no longer an advocate for the people. 
nowhere was this truer than algiers.
With the fall of the Soviet union, many algerians who had gone to fight 
in defense of islam returned home to limited economic opportunity. 
Serving alongside other devout Muslims in afghanistan had a   profound 
and lasting impact on these men. they began to see the algerian 
  government as rife with corruption and noted the lack of religion in daily 
life. Political parties, such as the islamic Salvation front (fiS), were not 
making progress on reforms22 and these veterans were quickly   growing 
frustrated. Most returnees from afghanistan had been thoroughly 
  indoctrinated in the afghan philosophy of jihad until either victorious or 
the achievement of martyrdom.
in 1988, the price of oil fell to an unprecedented $10 per barrel. With 
algeria dependent on oil exports to support its socialist agenda, it 
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wasn’t long before an economic crisis ensued. algerians flocked to the 
streets to protest the government and demand reform. the emerging 
islamic movement was quick to adopt the cause and fueled the   anger 
of   algerians by accusing the government of abandoning the tenets 
of   islam.23   President Bendjedid agreed to instill many reforms and 
  announced the first multiparty elections would be established. the fiS 
gained   tremendous support from the people as a movement dedicated to 
  establishing an islamic state in algeria.
in 1990, the fiS wins several seats at the local elections. they are 
  unprepared for this victory but quickly organize to prepare for the 
upcoming elections. the 1992 Parliamentary elections had just begun 
when the algerian military interrupted the proceedings and canceled 
the voting. Several fiS leaders were imprisoned and the ensuing chaos 
led to the creation of two paramilitary organizations. the armed islamic 
Movement (Mia) would operate in the rural areas and the newly created 
armed islamic group (gia) would operate in the urban environment. 
Disagreements soon arose between to the groups as the gia felt the 
fiS party leaders were too accommodating and needed to follow strict 
islamic rule. the Mia organized with several smaller islamic groups and 
joined the fiS-backed islamic Salvation army (aiS). the gia responded 
by declaring war on the fiS/aiS alliance.24
the gia, led by Djamel Zitouni, united under the umbrella of an   anti- 
government guerilla organization. Zitouni expanded the   organization by 
enlisting many former mujahedin fighters from the fields of afghanistan. 
this radical ethno-nationalist organization blended the notion of religion 
identity as a nationalist cause. to be a true   Muslim, you must unite under 
one banner and prepare for jihad in order to secure your homeland in the 
name of islam. the gia initially targeted   government and military  
facilities but also became known for   attacking civilians and personnel  
associated with the aiS.25 the gia engaged on a campaign of bombing 
and indiscriminate killing across algeria   throughout the mid-1990s. 
Several villages suspected of supporting aiS elements were burned to the 
ground and its inhabitants killed by   brutal methods. Many of the victims, 
including women and children, were   executed by machete attacks and 
had their bodies dismembered.
the primary goal of the gia was the establishment of an islamic state 
in algeria. While many algerians desired the same end state, the   brutal 
nature of the gia resulted in a significant loss of popular support. Most 
algerians were terrified of the methods in which the gia sought to 
  promote their agenda. as the 1990s progressed several members of the 
gia leadership began to disagree with the methods in which the gia 
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Section three: algeria’s civil war and 9/11
attacked civilian targets. they realized these attacks were leading to a 
continual loss of popular support. these men, Hassan Hattab and  
amari Saifi, issued a fatwa in 1997 calling for the gia to cease targeting 
civilians and for the creation of a new islamic organization that would 
carry the will of the people. ethno-nationalism in algeria had taken  
another turn.
Rise of the GPSC
Hassan Hattab was a paratrooper in the algerian armed forces. He 
used his military service to further his understanding of tactics and the 
political situation in algeria. following his military service, he became a 
mechanic where he saw the struggles of ordinary algerians in daily life. 
He became disillusioned with the algerian government and eventually 
joined the gia.26 While serving as a field commander for the gia, Hattab 
was enraged by the gia’s tactic of massacring algerian civilians. He felt 
this tactic detracted from the original goal of binding algerians together 
in the creation of the islamic state. Hattab and several others created the 
Groupe Salafiste pour le Predication et le Combat or the Salafist group 
for Preaching and combat (gSPc).
the gSPc immediately moved out of algiers and set up operations in  
two key areas. first, the Kabylie region in the north had access to 
the   major cities along the Mediterranean yet provided cover and 
  concealment. its forests and mountains provided training areas and 
sanctuary from military intervention. to control the forests and hills  
was to have an advantage and the gSPc wasted no time in adopting  
this strategy. Second, the vast southern region along algeria’s border 
with Mali and niger offered access to established smuggling routes  
and the freedom of movement required. Both regions were instrumental 
to the gSPcs overall strategy of challenging government forces at  
every step.
amari Saifi, also known as abderezzak el-Para, was a senior field  
commander under Hattab in the early days of the gSPc. Known as  
a “special forces” type of leader, Saifi often developed elaborate 
schemes of ambushes. His elaborate plans would lead him into direct 
  confrontation with the algerian military. in february of 2000, Saifi 
and his men   conducted a large-scale attack on an algerian convoy. the 
gSPc   successfully killed forty-two paratroopers and set the stage for the 
next round of attacks. to succeed in his conquest, he’d need arms and 
  equipment to prepare for battle. to achieve this end, he turned to his 
friend Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
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Mokhtar Belmokhtar (MBM) was born in algeria in 1972. He went to 
afghanistan to fight the Soviets and returned in the early 1990s to  
algeria. Belmokhtar moved to the southern town of tamanrassat and 
began to build a smuggling ring. He made a loose alliance with the  
tuaregs and often used tuareg convoys to move his goods.27 MBM lost an 
eye while fighting in afghanistan and is often called “one-eyed” by those 
in the region. MBM joined with the gSPc is thought to be the amir of the 
Saharan faction where is smuggles arms from niger, libya, and chad to 
the gSPc operating sites in Mali and algeria. MBM is known throughout 
the region and even married the daughter of a tuareg tribal chief in order 
to secure the loyalty of the tuaregs in the region.28
With Hattab in charge and Saifi and MBM ready to act, the gSPc  
prepared for direct engagement with the algerian government. to  
accomplish this feat, the gSPc developed and refined three key tactics. 
first, the trusted guerilla hit and run tactics was particularly effective 
along the roads that traversed the Kabylie region. gSPc squads could 
lie in ambush and attack military convoys as they moved from region to 
region. this also gave the gSPc the benefit of cover and concealment as 
well as a retreat route following the attack. Second, bombings were still a 
hallmark of the gSPc. to drive a truck bomb into a military checkpoint 
or a power station would continue to tax government resources to their 
very limit. finally, more high tech equipment such as anti-aircraft  
artillery and surface to air missiles would allow the gSPc to engage in 
direct conflict if they deemed it necessary.29
With the pieces in place, the gSPc had successfully carved out a viable 
operating area in which they could train, recuperate and reorganize, and 
smuggle both people and arms into and out of the region. these factors, 
coupled with an effective tactical campaign, allowed them to grow in 
influence and promote the ideology of the establishment of the islamic 
state. it was around this time that the gSPc began a loose affiliation 
with other terrorist groups throughout the region and across the globe. 
gSPc emissaries visited islamic groups in Morocco, libya, and tunisia. 
Veterans from the afghan conflict also appeared in yemen, Somalia, and 
Sudan. it was beginning to appear this small insurgency, where  
ethno-nationalist ambitions and local recruitment goals, would soon  
become part of a larger world order. the gSPc would soon become an 
arm of the global jihad nexus known as al Qaeda.
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Introduction
around 9:00 on a tuesday morning, the world changed. four airliners 
were hijacked by islamic terrorists and the ensuing tragedy recalculated 
the face of terrorism in the minds of the West. america was quick to 
identify the hijackers as members of the terrorist group al Qaeda. in the 
weeks that followed, President Bush delivered a riveting speech to both 
houses of congress in which he declared “you are either with us or you 
are with the terrorists.” in the geopolitical world of nations, this message 
was clear but in the nebulous world of non-state actors, the banner of 
jihad went global.
The GSPC after 9/11
With the attacks in america, most terrorist groups were forced to  
reevaluate their positions. attacking anything remotely american would 
certainly bring unwanted intervention in an ongoing campaign.  
american involvement in algeria may tip the balance and cause the gSPc 
all of the tactical gains it had made over the past few years.30
While the attacks in america were carried out by egyptians and Saudis, 
most north african terrorist focused their attacks on european interests. 
this was in part because of the lasting colonial influences in africa and the 
large number of ethnic africans that had immigrated throughout europe. 
fundraising and support networks for the gSPc had been established 
throughout europe in the united Kingdom, germany, Denmark, Sweden, 
and france. these cells also prepared attacks within europe and served 
as safe houses for terrorists in transit. these european cells also provided 
logistical aid to members of al Qaeda and a loose affiliation ensued.
al Qaeda, recognizing this affiliation, sent emissaries to visit the gSPc 
in 2002. Hassan Hattab, the amir of the gSPc, was quick to renounce 
this intrusion as he still maintained the overall goal of the gSPc was an 
islamic state in algeria.31 Several other members of the gSPc saw the 
overall goal expand from a domestic struggle to a larger struggle in  
defense of islam. among these dissenters were nabil Sahraoui and  
abdelmalek Droukdel.32 a significant amount of infighting began and 
ended in June 2004 when Hattab was forced to resign as amir. the 
Shura council appointed Sahraoui as the new amir of the gSPc. this 
was an important step in the transformation from domestic to global as 
Sahraoui had very different views than Hattab. He felt the jihad was a 
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global responsibility and directed the gSPc down the path of inclusion 
into al Qaeda’s global nexus.33
in 2003, amari Saifi, alias el Para, staged a daring capture of thirty-two 
german tourists in the algerian Desert. el Para kept thirty-two of the 
hostages until the german government paid approximately five millions 
euros in ransom. this event led to a significant increase in troops along 
the borders of Mali, algeria, niger, and chad. the military intervention 
forced el Para into chad where he was captured by chadian rebels and 
eventually turned over to algerian authorities.34 the loss of el Para and 
the removal of Belmokhtar from the zone 9 command signaled a turning 
point in the gSPcs evolution.
With Sahraoui in control, there was a significant change in recruitment 
and tactics. Jihadists from tunisia and libya were actively recruited 
upon completion of training in afghanistan.35 the gSPc was continuing 
to move toward the global nexus. in 2004, Sahraoui was killed in a fight 
with algerian forces in the Kabylie region. two members struggled to 
succeed Sahraoui with Droukdel emerging victorious.
abdelmalek Droukdel was quick to establish control of the gSPc. He 
quickly revamped the organizational structure and set the group on a 
path in line with al Qaeda’s strategy. Several cross border raids into 
Mauritania and ambushes in the Kabylie showed Droukdel’s willingness 
to commit “spectaculars.” the revamped gSPc took on a taliban-like 
command and control network.36
Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
With Zawahiri and bin laden leading al Qaeda’s charge, Droukdel soon 
decided to change the name to focus on the global jihad. in January of 
2007, a message was posted declaring the establishment of the al Qaeda 
in the lands of the islamic Maghreb (aQiM) organization. Jihadist 
groups around the world posted messages of congratulations to aQiM 
as they had joined the global jihad. this merger ended to nationalistic 
dreams spawned by the fln and reinforced by the fiS. this chapter of 
the ethno-nationalist fight for a united algeria, governed by the  
principles of islam, was lost.
Religion versus Religious Identity
Droukdel was quick to identify with the fundamental aspect of al Qaeda. 
the idea that islam was under attack and it was the duty of every Muslim 
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to defend islam through jihad transcended the notion of one country. the 
fln identified with religion when dealing with the colonial ambitions of 
france. the fln used terrorism from 1954–1962 to further the political 
agenda of nationalism. uniting algerian Muslims against an occupation 
was a religious duty. the tactics of engaging french targets, to include  
civilians, was purely nationalistic. aQiM calls of Muslims from around 
the region, around the world, to help in establishing an islamic   caliphate 
in north africa. While they still primarily attack government targets, 
aQiM is quick to identify with the larger islamic cause. Mobile   training 
bases in the Sahara Desert provide jihadists from around the region with 
training in explosives and guerilla tactics. the use of suicide   bombers 
has risen significantly in line with aQiM’s alignment with al Qaeda. the 
Salafis have shunned the tribal Sufis in the region as being “colonial 
lackeys” and resistant to the greater ambition of independence and the 
caliphate.37
Conclusion
Spawned from the days of french colonial ambitions, algeria is home 
to the original idea of independence. algerians as a whole sought to 
  marginalize french influence through defiance and unity. the national 
liberation front (fln) resorted to domestic acts of terrorism to   combat 
the occupation and force france to withdraw. the idea of isolating 
french forces from the population and driving france into repressive 
measures worked. the heavy handed tactics of general Massu defeated 
the fln but cost the french the war. faced with the loss of popular 
  support, france granted algeria her independence.
across the region, former colonies were ceding from their colonial 
  masters. the rise of chad, niger, Mali, Mauritania, and Morocco 
  created new borders across the Sahara and Sahel. ethnic tribes such as 
the tuaregs were forced from their traditional caravans and pastoral 
  grazing routes and relegated to a lower-class subject in a new   country. 
the   tuaregs resorted to smuggling as a way to survive. By moving 
goods, cigarettes, gasoline, and arms, the tuaregs were valuable to 
future separatists for two reasons. first, they knew the routes across the 
  Sahara and were the cultured people of the region. Second, they held the 
  governments of these new countries responsible for the loss of traditional 
rights to the grasses of the Sahelian savannah.
the fln, marginalized by politics and ruling with an authoritarian  
notion, canceled free elections in 1990. this led to the creation of the fiS 
and the radical gia. the gia felt the fiS was far too   accommodating  
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and resorted to a campaign of terror across algeria and europe. the 
gia used brutal tactics to ensure compliance and often destroyed entire 
villages in the process. they also waged a campaign of terror in france 
and other european countries. angered by the gia’s senseless killing of 
civilians, the gSPc was created by Hassan Hattab as a means to return 
to the fundamental concept of an islamic state in algeria. Hattab and the 
gSPc were primarily a nationalist group. they enjoyed warm relations 
with the tuaregs and had built a formidable smuggling operation in the 
years leading up to 9/11.
the start of the global war of terror changed the landscape in much the 
same way that the Soviet invasion of afghanistan had just 20 years  
earlier. it served as a rallying cry to many Muslims already   experienced 
in the way of jihad. al Qaeda was quick to tie the american   invasions 
of   afghanistan and iraq into a global attack on islam. Many 
  nationalist groups were pulled from their domestic plight into a larger 
  counterbalance to the american world order. the gSPc reorganized as 
aQiM and aligned itself with the global jihad. this meant an end to the 
traditional nationalist cause in the region and the beginning of a larger 
islamic nationalist campaign.
ethno-nationalism takes on many faces and the global war on terror 
has succeeded in tying many different causes into the counterbalance to 
perceived american hegemonic interests in the world. the new face of 
resistance is ethno-nationalism “with a twist.”
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